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ABSTRACT

Congress has identified the recent trend of pharmaceutical companies to settle
patent litigation under "pay-for-delay" settlements or reverse payment settlements.
Under these agreements, a generic maker receives a payment from a brand-name
company in exchange for withdrawing the patent challenge and refraining from
entering the market until an agreed date. Most courts have rejected antitrust
challenges to this practice in view of exclusive rights of patent holders and general
benefits from settlements. As part of the health care reform, Congress now proposes
to treat "pay-for-delay" settlements as per se illegal and entirely ban the practice.
The proposal, however, limits the ability to end uncertain and costly litigation and is
thus likely to discourage patent challenges and eventually harm the consumer.
Congress should replace the per se illegal treatment with a quick look balancing
approach to permit settlements if an antitrust analysis reveals its pro-competitive
effects.
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INTRODUCTION

"In business, as in life, there's no such thing as a perfect plan."1 Behind the
blockbuster antidepressant Prozac, there is a bitter story that explains the common
strategy of pharmaceutical companies to settle patent litigation. 2 Eli Lilly, the
patent holder, first gained the high ground when a district court upheld the patent's
validity. 3 The company was confident of a victory on appeal and refused a $200
million settlement. 4 The appellate court, however, invalidated the patent claim
5
covering Prozac, and Eli Lilly lost $2.6 billion in annual sales.
Recently, in lieu of risking invalidation, pharmaceutical patent holders have
often tried to settle litigation under a "pay-for-delay" agreement. 6 Under this type of
settlement, the brand-name company pays the generic firm to stay off the market
until a specified date, such as the patent expiration date.7 Often called reverse
payment settlements8 or "pay-for-delay" settlements, 9 these agreements are highly
* J.D. Candidate, May 2011, The John Marshall Law School.
M.S. Chemistry, Osaka
University, March 1998. I would like to thank my editors, Guy Barcelona, Kyle Badgley, and Nick
Dernik, for their help. Also, thank you to Stephanie Potter, Fumiko Onoue, and the members of The
John MarshallReview ofIntellectualPropertyLaw for their support.
1 John Simons, Lilly Goes OffProzac, FORTUNE, June 28, 2004, at 179.
2 See Bethany McLean, A Bitter Pill,FORTUNE, Aug. 13, 2001, at 122, 126.
3 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 917, 934 (S.D. Ind. 1999); McLean, supra
note 2, at 126.
4 McLean, supra note 2, at 126.
5 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Simons, supranote 1, at
180.
6 See James F. Ponsoldt & W. Hennen Ehrenclou, The Antitrust Legality of Pharmaceutical
Patent Litigation Settlements, 2006 J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 37, 41 (2006) ("Rather than incur the risks
of its 'probabilistic' patent rights, the pioneer manufacturer may opt to pay the generic
manufacturer to refrain from the challenge and to stay out of the market."); Maureen A. O'Rourke &
Joseph F. Brodley, An Incentives Approach to Patent Settlements, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1767, 1773-74
(2003).
7 See 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST, § 7.4e (Supp. 2007) [hereinafter
HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST] ("Insofar as antitrust is concerned, among the most
problematic settlement agreements are those in which the infringement plaintiff pays the
infringement defendant for the latter's abandonment of the market.").
8 See MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 364 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009) ("[Rleverse payment
agreements are not typical settlements. They are agreements that dispose of the validity and
infringement challenges central to the Hatch-Waxman scheme. Any general preference in the law
for settlement was displaced by the Act's specific framework.").
9 See Anticompetitive Pay-for-Delay Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Why
Consumers and the Federal Government Are Paying Too Much for Prescrjption Drugs: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of the
Federal Trade Commission), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Feinstein 090603.
pdf (stating "pay-for-delay" settlements are those in which "the brand-name drug firm pays its
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controversial and have antitrust implications because, under this system, a
potentially invalid patent can remain in effect and restrain competition. 1° Opponents
argue such settlements impair consumer access to generic drugs, but this contention
is likely to fail in court.1 1 Courts generally allow the settlements if their anticompetitive effects are within the "exclusionary zone of the patent" provided by
patent law. 12 Although the patent zone and antitrust zone are "complementary," the
13
line between the two zones is not always clear.
This comment addresses the antitrust implications of "pay-for-delay"
settlements.
Part I describes three regulations relating to "pay-for-delay"
settlements, the role of patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry, and the
regulatory framework that promotes generic competition. Part I then introduces
antitrust laws and pending bills aimed at preventing anti-competitive conduct. Part
II describes the inconsistent standards applied in court to "pay-for-delay" settlements
and explains the potential effects of the pending legislation on the pharmaceutical
industry. Part III proposes changes to the pending legislation to apply a standard
more suitable for "pay-for-delay" settlements, allowing for a more fact-specific but
relatively quick analysis. This modified approach will effectively reduce anticompetitive settlements that block consumer access to generic products.

potential generic competitor to abandon a patent challenge and delay entering the market with a
lower cost, generic product").
10See CARRIER, supra note 8, at 370 (taking the position that reverse-payment settlements
should be presumptively illegal); see also 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 307 (2d ed.
2005) ("[Alt least some settlement agreements raise significant antitrust issues and some would be
illegal per se if created in the absence of a genuine intellectual property dispute."). But see In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[T]here is a
long-standing policy in the law in favor of settlements, and this policy extends to patent

infringement litigation."), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009); Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-splitting
Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1034 (2004) ("There are
many circumstances where a reverse payment is necessary to resolve a patent litigation and that
resolution is better for consumers than continued litigation.").
11See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2003).
12 In re Ciprfloxacin Hydrochloride,544 F.3d at 1341; see United States v. Studiengesellschaft
Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The patentee is entitled to exact the full value
of his invention."); see also Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual
PropertyDispute, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1762 (2003) ("[Clourts ordinarily should not object to a
delayed-entry settlement, because it is likely to be an estimate of the expected outcome by the
parties with the best information about the outcome.").
13 See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cr. 1990)
("[T]the aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem ... wholly at odds. However,
the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging innovation,
industry and competition"); see also SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASsoc., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 58 (2007) [hereinafter SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST HANDBOOK] ("[Tihe Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission formally recognized that the intellectual property and antitrust laws are
complements.").
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I.BACKGROUND
"Pay-for-delay" settlements relate to three regulations that affect the
pharmaceutical business. 14 The regulations on patents and pharmaceutical products
control essential parts of innovators' businesses and require them to make large
investments while developing products and obtaining patents. 15
Generic firms
monitor the patents, develop their products, and try to invalidate the patents so they
can enter the market. 16 Innovators then face a high risk of losing the product's value
through litigation and generic competition. 17 "Pay-for-delay" settlements occur in
this unique context where companies try to recoup the investments and reduce the
risk of losing to the competition.' 8 This risk-avoiding practice, however, triggers
scrutiny under the antitrust regulation that prohibits anti-competitive conduct. 19
Concerned with an adverse impact of the settlements on consumer access to
affordable generics, Congress is now considering whether to amend the regulatory
20
framework to prohibit this practice.

A. RegulatorySchemes Relating to 'Pay-for-Delay"Settlements
The antitrust implications of "pay-for-delay" settlements involve three
regulatory schemes-patent laws, food and drug laws, and antitrust laws.2 1 Patent
laws shape the patent landscape and define which territory in the market is
exclusive to an innovator. 22 Food and drug laws, however, allow a generic firm to
seek an approval for marketing its product in that territory by claiming invalidity
and/or non-infringement of the patent. 23 Soon after the matter goes to a court, and
the parties dispute the validity and the scope of the patent. Antitrust laws become
involved when the parties settle the litigation to avoid the gamble of receiving
unfavorable judgments such as patent invalidity. 24 The laws intended to promote
14

See MICHAEL E. CLARK & CAROL A. POINDEXTER, PHARMACEUTICAL LAW 626 (Michael E.

Clark ed., Am. Bar Assoc. 2007).
15See id. at 625.
16 See CARRIER, supra note 8, at 351-52; JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW
14-16 (Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc. 2005).
17See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 625; Over a Dozen Fight on US Lamotrigine,
GENERICS BULLETIN, Feb. 13, 2009, at 16 (describing intense competition among more than a dozen
pharmaceutical companies).
18See O'Rourke & Brodley, supra note 6, at 1773-74 ("Without settlement, the alleged
infringer risks entry of a permanent injunction restraining it from marketing its product ... until
the patent's expiration, and a judgment ordering payment of damages in the amount of the
patentee's profits plus interest and costs.").
19See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 626.
20 See generally Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009)
(proposing legislation to assist generic drug makers enter the market); Protecting Consumer Access
to Generic Drugs Act of 2009, H.R. 1706, 11 1th Cong. (2009) (same).
21 See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 626.
22See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006); THOMAS, supra note 16, at 5-6.
23See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2006); THOMAS, supra note 16, at 14-16.
24 See HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 7, § 7.4el ("[Tihe problem of
exclusion payments can arise whenever the patentee has an incentive to postpone determination of
the validity of its patent."); see also Alden F. Abbott & Suzanne T. Michel, The Right Balance of
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competition may prohibit certain settlement agreements as anti-competitive. 25 These
three regulatory schemes thus largely affect the business of both innovators and
generic firms.2 6 For the innovators, securing effective patents to achieve market
27
exclusivity in desired territories is crucial.

B. PharmaceuticalInvestment in PatentProtection
Innovators must make large upfront investments in research because only one of
about four thousand new drugs receives approval to enter the market.2 8 As a result,
the innovator funds a broad range of patents to protect its products from competitors
and to recover their research costs.2 9 Patent protection is therefore essential for the
pharmaceutical business and "necessary to encourage innovation" in this field. 30

1. Investment and the PatentStrategy of Innovators
One study shows that the overall cost of developing a marketable drug is over
$800 million. 31 Even if the drug finally becomes marketable, it may not produce
sufficient profits to recoup development costs due to competition from inexpensive
generics. 32 To maximize patent protection, innovators try to obtain patents on
various matters such as novel drug substances and drug delivery methods. 33 A
common strategy is to obtain "good" and "strong" patents, casting a wide net to catch

Competition Policy and IntellectualPropertyLaw: A Perspective on Settlements ofPharmaceutical
PatentLitigation,46 IDEA 1, 24-25 (2005) ("[T]he brand firm and its generic rival are always better
off eliminating their expected competition and sharing the brand's monopoly profits.").
25See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 626.
26 See id.
27 See id. at 625; CARRIER, supra note 8, at 346.
28 CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 625; see also PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD
AND DRUG LAW 624 (3d ed. 2007) ("It is often estimated that, for every 5,000 chemicals screened,
five will proceed to clinical testing and one will survive to approval of [a new drug application].").
29 See HUTT ET AL., supra note 28, at 764 (stating a short patent life "may not be long enough
for a drug's sponsor to recoup the full research and development investment made in the drug other
than by charging extremely high prices").
30 THOMAS, supra note 16, at 4 ("Pharmaceuticals stand among one of the few fields where
experts agree that patent protection is necessary to encourage innovation.").
31 See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 625-26; see also CARRIER, supra note 8, at 300
("Pharmaceutical companies devote approximately 75 percent of their R&D to product innovation.").
32 See William Shieber, One View from the Road:
State Antitrust Enforcement in
PharmaceuticalCases, in ANTITRUST 74, 75 (Spring 2004) ("Branded pharmaceuticals generally lose
over 80 percent of their market share within two years of the onset of generic competition."); see also
Tough Times for Big Pharma,MED AD NEWS, September 2008, at 4 ("With 2007 as its first full year
battling generic competition, sales for Merck's cholesterol drug Zocor fell to $877 million, less than a
third of sales generated in 2006.").
33 See THOMAS, supra note 16, ch. 2.JJJ-IV (describing various types of pharmaceutical patent
claims including drug substances, formulations, chemical intermediates, metabolites, prodrugs,
crystals, polymorphs, isomers, salts, methods of using a drug for combination therapies, methods of
making a pharmaceutical, and methods of medical treatment).
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potential infringers and protecting its commercial products from competition. 34 To
obtain such patents, innovators select promising inventions for submission to the
35
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO").

2. PatentProsecutionand Validity of Patents
Patent prosecution starts with filing an application in the USPTO and, if
successful, ends with the grant of a patent. 36 Examiners at the USPTO evaluate
whether the claimed subject matter is novel and non-obvious with respect to prior
art. 37 After issuance, a patent is presumed to be valid unless a court decides
otherwise. 38 Despite the presumption of validity, generic makers have invalidated
many patents in court, which has allowed generic products to enter the market. 39
Noting the possibility of invalidation, some argue that the patent holder is entitled to
only a "right to try to exclude." 40 Under this view of "probabilistic" patent rights,
patentees have rights to assert their patents, but their exclusionary power is not
fully vested. 41 Rather, the power depends on court decisions regarding the patent
validity. 42 This view of "partial property rights" leads to the contention that the
43
patentee is not entitled to buying exclusion under "pay-for-delay" settlements.

C. Marketing Generic Drugsand Hatch-Waxman Act
Generic drugs 44 are priced lower than brand-name drugs "because their
manufacturers do not incur the research, development, and promotional costs
34See MARTIN A. VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE:

UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA &

PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 82 (2d ed. 2008) (describing "good" patents as broad
patents and "strong" patents as narrow patents).
35See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2006); VOET, supra note 34, at 82-85.
36 See 35 U.S.C. § 151.
37 See id. § 102(b) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... the invention was patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country... more than one year prior to the
date of the application for patent in the United States."); id. § 103(a) ("A patent may not be
obtained.., if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious.").
38 Id. § 282; see 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.02 (2008) (addressing the
question of whether the presumption of patent validity is "primarily a procedural device, merely
shifting the burden of proof on issues of fact that are pertinent to a legal conclusion on validity, or a
rule of deference to the determination of patentability by the [USPTO]").
39See CARRIER, supranote 8, at 346.
40 See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND. J. ECON. 391, 395
(2003).
41 Id. at 395; see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. ScheringPlough
Corp. No. 05-273, 2005 WL 2105243 (U.S. Aug. 29, 2005).
42 See Shapiro, supra note 40, at 395.
43 See id. at 407-08.
44THOMAS, supra note 16, at 307, 310 (stating the term generic drug refers to drugs that
contain "the same active ingredients as but not necessarily the same inactive ingredients as a
'pioneer drug' that is sold under a brand name" or those that contain a different active ingredient
but are expected to have the same therapeutic effect).
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normally associated with the creation and marketing of an original product." 45 To
facilitate consumer access to inexpensive generic drugs, Congress enacted the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act ("Hatch-Waxman Act")46 to
amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FD&C Act") 47 in 1984.48
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides "expedited marketing approval pathways" for
generic firms that file an abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA") with the
FDA. 49 Consumers usually benefit from inexpensive alternatives and resulting
competition that drives down the drug prices.5 0 The Act also provides generic
exclusivity for one hundred and eighty days, during which time the first ANDA filer
can exclude other generic entrants.5 1 This generic exclusivity is a reward for
52
challenging the patent and opening the door for more generics.

D. Litigation and "Pay-for-Delay"
Settlements
In patent litigation, parties contest the scope of the patent claims in Markman
hearings and discuss validity and infringement contentions at later stages.53 One
way generic firms can challenge validity is by presenting a previously published
54
reference that discloses the patented invention.

45

United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 455 n.1 (1983); see also CLARK &

POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 625-26 (stating the cost for bringing a generic drug to the market is
about $1 to $2 million as compared to $800 million for an innovator).
46 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360c (2006); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282
(2006)).
47 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399a (2006).
48 See THOMAS, supra note 16, at 14 (stating consumers could not fully benefit from the lower
cost before Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act because "the approval of a generic drug was a
needlessly costly, duplicative, and time-consuming process"); see also CARRIER, supra note 8, at 355
("On the whole, the Hatch-Waxman Act has been successful in increasing generic entry. Generic
drugs, which made up 19 percent of prescriptions for drug products in 1984, increased to 65 percent
in 2008.".
49 See THOMAS, supra note 16, at 14-19 (describing procedures for obtaining a generic
marketing approval and requirements for filing an ANDA); see also CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra
note 14, at 625-26 (stating it takes 10-15 years for an innovator to develop a marketable product,
whereas a generic firm can bring its product into the market "in a fraction of the time").
50 See HUTT ET AL., supra note 28, at 766 ("[G]eneric manufacturers typically undercut the
price of the pioneer drug by only about 5 percent during their exclusive marketing period, but then
are forced to reduce the price by 50 percent or more as other generic manufacturers receive
approvals of their [ANDAs]."); see also Abbott & Michel, supra note 24, at 27 ("Consumers are
always better off with the possibility of competitive entry and lower prices than they are with the
certainty of no entry."). But see CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 627 (suggesting a
possibility that drastically lowering price may "drive out competitors and eventually injure
consumers").
51 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); see THOMAS, supranote 16, at 24-25.
52 THOMAS, supra note 16, at 18-19.
53 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 271 (2006); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,
976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating an infringement analysis includes the first step of determining the
meaning and scope of a claim and the second step of comparing the construed claim with an accused
product), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
54 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103; see, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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During the course of litigation, the parties must decide whether to maintain
litigation while considering other various legal and business matters. 55 The deciding
factors are often the strength of the patent, prospective value of the patent, and the
impact of litigation results on competition with other generics. 56 When parties fear
intense competition with others, they usually settle and agree on a fixed generic
entry date in exchange for certain compensation.5 7 If the settlement harms
58
competition, however, potential antitrust implications may arise.

E. Antitrust Laws and Regulations
Federal statutes provide a basis for the current enforcement of antitrust laws in
"pay-for-delay" settlements. 59 In the long history of judicial interpretation and
application of the statutes, courts developed three analytical standards for evaluating
antitrust claims: 1) the rule of reason; 2) the per se rule; and 3) the quick look
standard.6 0
Currently, antitrust tribunals facing "pay-for-delay" settlements
disagree on which standard to apply. A pending House bill, however, promotes a per
6 1
se illegal treatment of "pay-for-delay" settlements.

55See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST HANDBOOK,
supra note 13, at 247 (stating settlements may produce "greater market power and more exclusion
than would result if the parties had continued to litigate"); see also CARRIER, supra note 8, at 364
("Settlements are particularly beneficial for patent litigation, which is lengthy, complex, and
costly.").
56See HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 7, § 7.4e2 ("Undoubtedly, what had
increased their attraction under [the Hatch-Waxman Act] is the fact.., that a properly defined
settlement-plus-exclusion-payment not only keeps the immediate infringement defendant out of the
market for a time but also keeps other generic firms from entering as well.").
57 See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (i th Cir. 2003) ("Patent
litigation is too complex and the results too uncertain for parties to accurately forecast whether
enforcing the exclusionary right through settlement will expose them to treble damages if the patent
immunity were destroyed by the mere invalidity of the patent."); see also Thomas F. Cotter,
Antitrust Implications ofPatent Settlements Involving Reverse Payments: Defending a Rebuttable
Presumption ofllegalityin Light ofSome Recent Scholarship, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1069, 1079 (2004)
("[J]n the context of Hatch-Waxman even a patent owner with a high probability of success on the
merits may have a tremendous incentive to settle the case with a reverse payment.").
58 See CARRIER, supranote 8, at 363.
59Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006));
Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27);
Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58); see CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 632-44 (describing federal antitrust
laws and antitrust litigation involving pharmaceutical business entities).
60 See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 630-31 ("Courts and regulators have struggled
over the years to develop appropriate standards for evaluating conduct claimed to unfairly restrict
competition.").
61See Ken Letzler & Sonia Pfaffenroth, Patent Settlement Legislation: Good Medicine or
Wrong Prescription? in ANTITRUST 81, 83 ("[Slupporters would argue that this is a routine
application of the per se rule to an agreement not to compete.").
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1. Existing FederalAntitrustLaws and Enforcement
To address antitrust violations, Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890,62 and
in 1914 passed the Clayton Act 6 3 and the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC
Act").64 The Sherman Act prohibits contracts "in restraint of trade or commerce
66
among the several States." 65 The Clayton Act prohibits certain acquisitions as well.
The FTC Act created the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and empowered it to
stop, at an early stage, certain practices that are likely to violate the Sherman and
67
Clayton Acts.
Various entities can initiate litigation to enforce the antitrust laws.6 8 The FTC
and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") can bring a civil
70
lawsuit.6 9 Consumers can sue business entities under the Clayton Act.
Furthermore, pursuant to the FTC Act, the FTC may file an administrative
complaint against antitrust violators. 71 After proceedings before an administrative
law judge and then the full commission, a party may appeal the decision to a court of
appeals. 72 In analyzing antitrust claims, courts apply different standards depending
73
on the nature of activity at issue.

62 Sherman
63

Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7).
Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-

27).
64 Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58).
65 15 U.S.C. § 1 ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ...is declared to be illegal.").
66 Id. § 18 (prohibiting acquisitions whose effects "may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly").
67 See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966) ("[The Commission can]

arrest trade restraints in their incipiency without proof that they amount to an outright violation of

§ 3 of the Clayton Act or other provisions of the antitrust laws."); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Motion
Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953).
68 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) ("Whenever the United States is hereafter injured in its business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws it may sue therefor in the United
States district court for the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent ...").
69

Id.;

see SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST HANDBOOK,

supra note 13, at 54-56 (stating the FTC and the DOJ employ similar procedures for civil
investigations).
70 15 U.S.C. § 15 ("[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States ....
");
see CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 663 ("In evaluating whether a plaintiff
has standing to pursue relief under the Clayton Act, courts will also examine the type of allegations
made to determine whether a given plaintiff will be an 'efficient enforcer' to seek redress for such
misconduct.").
7115 U.S.C. § 45(b).
72 Id. § 45(c) ("Any person, partnership, or corporation required by an order of the Commission
to cease and desist from using any method of competition or act or practice may obtain a review of
such order in the [circuit] court of appeals of the United States ....
73 See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 644.
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2. Standardsfor AntitrustAnalysis
Courts have developed three analytical standards: 1) the rule of reason; 2) the
per se rule; and 3) the quick look standard.7 4 These standards call for a different
75
degree of inquiry in examining antitrust violation.
The rule of reason is the default standard courts have applied to most antitrust
76
claims for evaluating whether an "unreasonable restraint" of competition occurs. It
involves a detailed three-step analysis 77 starting with the requirement for the
plaintiff to prove an "actualadverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant
market."7 8 If the proof is acceptable, then the defendant must demonstrate procompetitive effects. 79 When the defendant meets the burden, the plaintiff must
present "less restrictive" alternatives.80 The first step of this analysis is essential
and requires determination of whether the "harm is not only possible but likely and
significant."8 1 The analysis, however, tends to be complex because it requires
82
detailed economic analyses to define elements such as the relevant market.
As an exception to the rule of reason, courts developed the per se approach for a
special class of activities.8 3 After evaluating various claims, courts started seeing
common practices that had only a "predictable and pernicious anticompetitive
effect." 84 Courts deemed such practices per se illegal "without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm."85 According to the Supreme Court, the per se illegality is proper

74

Id. at 630-31.
at 644-53.

75See id.

76 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) ("Although the Sherman Act, by its terms,
prohibits every agreement 'in restraint of trade,' this Court has long recognized that Congress
intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints."); see CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 646.
77K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995)
("Establishing a violation of the rule of reason involves three steps."); Capital Imaging Ass'n, P.C.,
Mohawk Valley Med. Ass'n, 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993).
78 K.M.B. Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 127.
79 Id.; Capitallmaging,
996 F.2d at 543.
80KM.B.Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 127; CapitalImaging,996 F.2d at 543.
81 7 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 347-48 (2002); see Cal.
Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 775 n.12 (1999) ("[Tlhere must be some indication
that the court making the decision has properly identified the theoretical basis for the
anticompetitive effects and considered whether the effects actually are anticompetitive.").
82 See, e.g., Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 496 (2d Cir. 2004)
(illustrating an instance where a district court and the second Circuit disagree on how the relevant
market should be defined in a pharmaceutical antitrust litigation); see also CLARK & POINDEXTER,

supra note 14, at 647 ("If the rule of reason standard is used, the relevant market for the products
and geographic area must be determined as a preliminary step to assessing whether the defendant
had sufficient market power to harm competition.").
83 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 396 ("[A] per se rule is merely a special case of
the rule of reason.").
84 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); see N. Pac. Ry Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958) ("[Tihere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal.").
85 N Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5; see CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 644 ("The Supreme
Court... has observed that certain types of behavior are simply so unlikely to have any competitive
justifications that such conduct should be conclusively adjudged illegal without any need to consider
proffered justifications."); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 404 ("The root meaning
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"[o]nce experience with a particular type of restraint enables the Court to predict
with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it."86 Thus, a court should not
87
employ the per se standard when "the economic impact is not immediately obvious."
Between the rule of reason and the per se rule lies the quick look standard, or
"truncated rule of reason."88 It allows a court to conduct less than the full analysis
and assume the rest of the factors.8 9 The quick look is proper when challenged acts
"are not per se unlawful but are sufficiently anticompetitive on their face that they do
not require a full-blown rule of reason inquiry." 90 The analysis takes much less time
than the rule of reason and yet allows some flexibility for tailoring to particular
circumstances. 91 An analyst suggests that the quick look standard, rather than the
broad per se illegality standard, is suitable for the antitrust analysis of "pay-for92
delay" settlements.

3. AntitrustAnalysis of 'Pay-for-Delay"Settlements
In analyzing "pay-for-delay" settlements, the FTC and the courts apply different
standards. 93 The Courts of Appeals for the Sixth ("Sixth Circuit") and Second
("Second Circuit") Circuits employ the per se rule, 94 the FTC and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") support the rule of reason, 95 and
of 'per se illegality' is that courts refuse to consider one or more factors that would ordinarily bear on
the reasonableness of challenged conduct.").
86 Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); see In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (agreeing with the finding of the
district court that there was no basis to "confidently predict" that the agreement would be unlawful
under the rule of reason analysis) cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009).
87 In re CiprofloxacinHydrochloride,544 F.3d at 1332.
88 See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 651-53.
89 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 393 ("[J]udgments can sometimes be made on
the basis of the parties' agreements in light of what the judges know about the economy and in light
of such modest information as may be available at the beginning of the lawsuit.").
90 Cal. DentalAss'n, 526 U.S. at 763 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 128
F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1999)).
91 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 390-95 (stating courts can apply the rule of
reason summarily or, if appropriate, conduct "instantaneous balancing in the twinkle of an eye");
Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the Federal
Courts, in 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 359-62 (2001) (describing a "sliding scale approach that tailors
the inquiry to the particular circumstances").
92 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 329 ("[E]xit payments represent a significant threat to
competition, making a full rule of reason inquiry unnecessary."). "A blanket per se rule prohibiting
all payments to infringement defendants in exchange for promises to stay out of the patentee's
market seems too broad." Id. at 328.
93 See CARRIER, supra note 8, at 357-64 (summarizing several key pharmaceutical antitrust
cases and addressing different standards that courts applied in the antitrust analysis); see also 2
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR Assoc., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1434-35 (2007)
[hereinafter SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS] (describing the
disagreement between the Sixth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit regarding the antitrust analysis in
view of the patent right).
94 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir. 2003); In re Tamoxifen
Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2005).
95 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009); Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 1208 (2003).
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the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ("Eleventh Circuit") takes a quick
look.96
The Sixth Circuit held that "pay-for-delay" settlements were per se illegal in In
re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation.97 Some commentators support this position
because, in their view, "the reduction in uncertain competition itself is sufficient to
demonstrate an anticompetitive effect."98 In contrast, the Second Circuit took the
opposite view and held a "pay-for-delay" settlement as per se legal. 99 The court
feared that extensive restriction of settlement practice might adversely affect
innovation.100
The FTC employed the rule of reason in evaluating "pay-for-delay" settlements
between Schering-Plough and other drug makers. 10 1 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
10 2
allowed the settlements but rejected both the rule of reason and the per se rule.
The court noted the unique environment of "cripple competition" created by the
patent exclusion and came up with a three-part test that appeared to be a quick look
approach. 10 3 The test examined "(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the
patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the
10 4
resulting anticompetitive effects."
The Federal Circuit supported the rule of reason and allowed a "pay-for-delay"
agreement in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation.10 5 The court
indicated that the district court properly employed a full rule of reason analysis,
0 6
although it ended at the first step due to insufficient proof from the plaintiff.
Consumers and advocacy groups argued the anti-competitive effects of the
agreement, but the court viewed that they were "within the exclusionary zone of the
10 8
patent." 10 7 The Supreme Court declined to review the decision.
The DOJ also endorses the rule of reason, according to its brief filed in a case
currently pending in the Second Circuit. 10 9
It specifically rejected per se
condemnation of patent settlements under the Sherman Act, noting that the
"likelihood of anticompetitive effects not attributable solely to the patent is not so

96 See Schering-Plough Corp. v.Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2003).
97 332 F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
98 Abbott & Michel, supra note 24, at 27.
99 See In re Tamoxifen., 466 F.3d 187, 208 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[So long as the patent litigation is
neither a sham nor otherwise baseless, the patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement in
order to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly.").
100 Id. at 203 ("Rules severely restricting patent settlements might also be contrary to the goals
of the patent laws because the increased number of continuing lawsuits that would result would
heighten the uncertainty surrounding patents and might delay innovation.").
101 ScheringPlough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 1208 (2003).
102 Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2003).
103 Id. at 1066.
104 Id.

105 544 F.3d 1323, 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009).
106 Id. at 1332.
107 Id. at 1341.
108 Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009).
109 Brief for the United States in Response to the Court's Invitation, at 20-21, Arkansas
Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer, AG, No. 05-2851-cv (2009) [hereinafter DOJBrieA,

availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f247700/247708.pdf.
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great" as to justify a per se treatment. 110 Instead, the DOJ argued "pay-for-delay"
settlements are presumptively unlawful, and antitrust defendants must offer
evidence to show that the patentee did not purchase reduced competition."' The
DOJ seems to focus on prohibiting a large payment because it explains that the
defendants "clearly rebut the presumption" just by making the payment less than the
avoided litigation costs of the patentee. 112 If the payment is greater, simply pointing
out the benefits from an early generic entry is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption. 113 The antitrust defendants must show that the terms of agreement
"reasonably reflected their contemporaneous evaluations of likelihood that a
judgment in the patent litigation would have resulted in generic competition before
1 14
patent expiration."
Although the recent position of the DOJ for limiting "pay-for-delay" settlements
generally accords with the approach of the FTC, the DOJ previously disagreed with
the FTC when the FTC sought a Supreme Court review in Sehering-Pough.115 The
DOJ argued that the Supreme Court should deny the petition for a writ of certiorari
because the case did not "present an appropriate opportunity ...to determine the
proper standards for distinguishing legitimate patent settlements ... from
illegitimate settlements."" 6 The Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal from the
Eleventh Circuit. 117 Thus, opponents of the "pay-for-delay" practice stress the need
for a legislative action.

4. PendingLegislationAddressing 'Pay-for-Delay"Settlements
Two bills that specifically address "pay-for-delay" settlements are pending in the
current Congress. Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI) introduced one bill ("S. 369") in
February 2009,118 and Representatives Bobby Rush (D-IL) and Henry Waxman (DCA) introduced the other ("H.R. 1706") in March 2009.119 After an amendment, H.R.
1706 became part of a health care reform bill H.R. 3200.120 The House then passed a
revised health care reform bill ("H.R. 3962") on November 7, 2009, including Section
2
2573 limiting "pay-for-delay" settlements.' '
110 Id. at 20-21. But see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 11, Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273) ("[Tlhe mere presence of a

reverse payment in the Hatch-Waxman context is not sufficient to establish that the settlement is
unlawful.").
111DOJBrief,supra note 109, at 21, 27.

Id. at 28.
113
Id. at 29-32.
114Id. at 30-3 1. But see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 110, at 12
112

(criticizing the FTC that it apparently placed "undue weight on the parties' subjective views of the
strength of the claims as reflected in the settlement agreement, as opposed to a more objective

assessment of the claims based on evidence extrinsic to the settlement").
115Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 110, at 8.
116Id.
117 Fed.

Trade Comm'n v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006).
Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009).
119Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act, H.R. 1706, 111th Cong. (2009).
120 See America's Affordable Health Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 11 1th Cong. § 2563 (2009).
121 See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 2573(b) (2009); 155
CONG. REC. H12968 (2009). Section 2573 of H.R. 3962 remains essentially the same as H.R. 1706.
118 Preserve
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H.R. 3962 prohibits settlements where "an ANDA filer receives anything of
value" more than the right to enter the market before the exclusivity period of the
patentee expires. 122 As such, a settlement agreement would violate the FTC Act if it
grants a generic entry before the patent expiration and additionally allows some
payment from the patentee to the accused infringer. 123 The bill, however, does have a
section providing an exception to this blanket prohibition of "pay-for-delay"
settlements. 124
It allows the FTC to promulgate rules and exempt certain
agreements if the Commission finds that they are "in furtherance of market
125
competition and for the benefit of consumers."'
S. 369 was originally similar to H.R. 1706 and proposed to ban settlements
where "an ANDA filer receives anything of value" more than the right to enter the
market before the patent expiration. 126 The bill then underwent a substantive
amendment to permit some "pay-for-delay" settlements. 127 The amended S. 369
treats "pay-for-delay" settlements as presumptively unlawful, except when the
settlement parties can show pro-competitive benefits outweighing anti-competitive
effects by clear and convincing evidence. 128
To overcome the presumption of
illegality, parties of a proposed agreement may present evidence to support procompetitive effects of the agreement. 129 In examining whether the parties have met
the burden of proof, the fact finder may consider seven factors listed in the bill. 130
The factors include the timing of an agreement with respect to the remaining patent
life' 3' and terms of the agreement such as the amount of payment. 132 The fact finder
may also consider the expected economic gain and loss by generic and brand-name
133
firms after the resolution of the dispute.

See Protecting Consumer Access to Generics Drugs Act, H.R. 1706, 111th Cong. (2009); Affordable
Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 2573 (2009).
122 See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 2573(b) (2009).
123

See id.

124

See id.

125Id.
126

See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. § 29(a)(1) (2009).

See id. § 28(a)(2)(A)-(B). See 155 CONG. REC. D1181 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2009).
See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. § 28(a)(2)(A)-(B) (2009).
129 Id.§ 28(b).
127
128

130Id.

(1) the length of time remaining until the end of the life of the relevant patent,
compared with the agreed upon entry date for the ANDA product; (2) the value to
consumers of the competition from the ANDA product allowed under the
agreement; (3) the form and amount of consideration received by the ANDA filer
in the agreement resolving or settling the patent infringement claim; (4) the
revenue the ANDA filer would have received by winning the patent litigation; (5)
the reduction in the NDA holder's revenues ifit had lost the patent litigation; (6)
the time period between the date of the agreement conveying value to the ANDA
filer and the date of the settlement of the patent infringement claim; and (7) any
other factor that the fact finder, in its discretion, deems relevant to its
determination of competitive effects under this subsection.
Id.

131 Id.§
132 Id.§
133 Id.

28(b)(1).
28(b)(3).

§ 28(b)(4)-(5).
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Congress has made some progress in the House and the Senate to limit
"sweetheart deals" between pharmaceutical litigants. 134 It is, however, uncertain
whether Congress will pass a law drawing a fine line between the patent zone and
135
the antitrust zone.

II. ANALYSIS
A recurring problem in the antitrust analysis of "pay-for-delay" settlements is
that the FTC and court decisions are inconsistent, primarily because of the
application of conflicting standards. 136 To illustrate the problem, an analysis of these
standards and their applicability to "pay-for-delay" settlements is presented below.
The analysis examines the merits and demerits of employing each of the standards
based on two hypothetical examples involving "pay-for-delay" settlements. The
comparison reveals that the quick look analysis is more suitable for the problem at
137
hand compared to the impractical rule of reason and the oversimplified per se rule.
Pending House bill H.R. 3962 that takes the per se approach, the amended S. 369
that imposes a presumption, and the DOJ approach that employs the rule of reason
are then analyzed to evaluate their potential effects on the pharmaceutical industry.

A. Evaluation ofAntitrust Analysis UnderEach of Three Standards
The FTC and the courts have analyzed "pay-for-delay" settlements under the
rule of reason, the per se rule, and the quick look standard. 138 The following
hypothetical examples show that the quick look standard appears to be the most
134 Statement of FTC Chairman, Jon Leibowitz, Senate Judiciary Committee's Passage of the
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act (S. 369), Oct. 15, 2009, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/
pfdvote.shtm.
135 See Anticompetitive Pay-for-Delay Settlements in the PharmaceuticalIndustry:
Why
Consumers and the Federal Government Are Paying Too Much for ProrptionDrugs: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy, 111th Cong. 19 (2009) (statement of the
Federal Trade Commission), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Feinstein 090603.
pdf ("H.R. 1706 offers a straightforward means to quickly combat anticompetitive conduct that is

pervasive and costly to consumers, while also providing flexibility to protect procompetitive

arrangements."). But see Pay to Delay: Are PatentSettlements That Delay Generic Drug Market
Entry Anticompetitive9' HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H
Comm. On the Judiciary,111th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Guy Donatiello, Endo Pharmaceuticals
Inc.), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Donatiello090603.pdf ("H.R. 1706 would
add cost and uncertainty to bringing new branded and generic medicines to patients. Instead of an
across-the-board ban, enforcement agencies and courts should continue to evaluate patent
settlements on a case-by-case basis ... ").
136 See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 644-53 (providing summaries of
pharmaceutical antitrust cases to illustrate the application of different standards in the antitrust
analysis); Ronald W. Davis, Reverse Payment Patent Settlements: A View into the Abyss, and a
Modest Approach, in ANTITRUST 26 (Fall 2006).
137 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 328 ("A blanket per se rule ... seems too broad.");
CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 651 (stating the quick look standard is "particularly
helpful" for examining conduct that is not perse illegal but has anti-competitive effects).
138

See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 644-53.
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suitable because it allows quick balancing of some particularly relevant factors and
accurately predicts the effects of "pay-for-delay" settlements.

1. Hypothetical 'Pay-for-Delay"Settlements
Two hypothetical settlements between the innovator and the first ANDA generic
firm are presented below. The first scenario illustrates a more pro-competitive
settlement, and the second scenario illustrates a more anti-competitive settlement.
In the first scenario, the parties settle two years before the patent expiration
date. The agreement involves a payment of expected litigation costs to the generic
firm and allows for market entry six months before the patent expiration.
Additionally, the patent claims a novel drug substance, and four subsequent ANDA
filers are eagerly waiting to start marketing their products. The patentee believes it
will prevail in the litigation, but does not wish to risk patent invalidation because it
would allow the entry of multiple generic alternatives.
In the second scenario, the settlement involves a payment substantially
exceeding expected litigation costs but does not allow the generic entry until the
patent expires. The patent claims a product with a new drug delivery mechanism
that is a relatively simple modification of an existing mechanism. The generic firm
believes it will prevail in the litigation, but it wishes to obtain an upfront payment
for funding other projects. Below, these hypothetical settlements are evaluated
under each of the three standards.

a. Analysis Under the Quick Look Standard
The quick look analysis will properly predict the effects of both hypothetical
settlements. Consideration of at least two factors, the patent subject matter and the
generic entry date, readily reveals the pro-competitive and anti-competitive nature of
the first and second agreements, respectively.
In the first scenario, the patent claims a novel chemical substance. Such patents
often survive invalidity challenges because it is usually hard to prove the obviousness
of new chemical substances with pharmaceutical benefits. 139 The generic firm
therefore has a lower expected chance of invalidating the patent. Also, the
settlement provides generic entry six months early, which enhances competition and
benefits the consumer. The generic firm secures a fixed entry date and thus does not
need to continue expensive litigation. While enjoying the one hundred and eightyday generic exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the firm can develop and
establish the generic market. 140 Once the patent expires, the four generics can
immediately join the market, and inexpensive generics can easily reach the

139 See, e.g., Takeda Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (holding a patent claim on a new chemical compound non-obvious under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) (2006)).
140 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006) (providing 180 day-exclusivity).
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consumer. 4 1 This quick look analysis shows likely pro-competitive benefits of the
settlement without extensive evaluation.
In the second scenario, the generic firm has a higher chance of invalidating the
patent due to the apparent obviousness of the claimed subject matter. 142 The
agreement allows the market entry of the first ANDA filer on the patent expiration
date, but not other generics due to the one hundred and eighty-day exclusivity period
that starts when the first filer begins marketing. 143 It significantly delays the entry
of subsequent filers, and thus an antitrust tribunal may quickly determine that the
defendants do not show a threshold level of pro-consumer effects. The expenditure of
time and resources for the quick look analysis will be substantially lower than that
144
for the detailed rule of reason analysis.

A Analysis Under the Rule ofReason
The rule of reason is the extended version of the quick look analysis discussed
above, and it will eventually lead to accurate predictions. 145 It is consistent with the
traditional evaluation of general antitrust claims, and offers an accurate analysis in
146
line with extensive case law.
Under this approach, however, there are numerous complex and important
elements to examine. 147 For example, the antitrust tribunal must first define the
relevant market in each scenario. It is, however, unclear whether the market should
include the brand-name and generic products as well as other drugs used for the
same medical condition. 148 Also, the evaluation of many factors in addition to those
considered in the quick look may lead to inconsistent analyses because the factors
can be weighed against each other in quite different manners. 149 For example, the
141 See Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2009: Hearing on HR. 1706
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Polhey, 11 1th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of William
P. (Bill) Kennedy, Co-Owner of Nephron Pharmaceuticals Corp.), available at http://judiciary.house.
gov/hearings/pdf/Kennedy09O6O3.pdf ("[With a third or fourth competitor in the market, the generic
drug pricing model takes over, allowing for pricing to reach truly 'pro-consumer' levels.").
142 35 U.S.C. § 103(a); see, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415-16 (2007).
143 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
144 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 391-93 (suggesting a court taking a rule of
reason approach in a quick look form does not need to require a full trial and could summarily hold a
challenged activity as "facially unreasonable").
145 See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 646-53.
146 See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); CLARK & POINDEXTER,
supra note 14, at 646.
147 See K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995).
148 See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 496 (2d Cir. 2004)
(disagreeing with the district court on how the relevant market should be defined in a
pharmaceutical antitrust litigation); HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 329 ("[Mlarket definition

questions in the pharmaceutical industry are particularly troublesome because of the high degree of
product differentiation that distinguishes branded drugs from one another, notwithstanding
considerable overlap in the treatment of certain conditions or symptoms."); see also CLARK &
POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 648-49 (pointing out difficulties in defining the relevant market in
the rule of reason analysis).
149 See, e.g., ScheringPlough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (lth
Cir.
2003) (criticizing the analysis of the FTC by stating that "[diespite the appearance that it openly
considered [the settlement parties'] procompetitive affirmative defense, the Commission
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strength of a patent could be a primary factor in one court, whereas the size of a
1 °
payment could be a factor with a higher weight in another court.
In addition, the detailed analysis may cause a significant delay and have a
negative impact on the highly time-sensitive pharmaceutical industry. 15 1 If the
parties trying to settle before the patent expiration have to wait until the FTC
conducts a thorough analysis, the settlement may be significantly delayed, and the
pro-consumer effect may be negated. A quicker but less complicated alternative will
15 2
be the per se analysis.

c. Analysis Under the Per Se Rule
The Sixth Circuit, applying a per se rule, would hold both hypothetical
settlements as per se illegal because they involve a payment. Thus, this approach
has the disadvantage of prohibiting a settlement that is likely to produce procompetitive benefits such as the first example.
The blanket condemnation of "pay-for-delay" practice draws support from a
probabilistic view of patent property, which regards the patent right as only a "right
to try to exclude." 15 3 This view, however, conflicts with the presumption of validity
for issued patents under patent law. 154 Once the USPTO examines a patent
application and decides its patentability, the patentee should be able to enjoy the
exclusive right until the patent expires. 15 5 In the first scenario, the patentee agrees
to abandon a part of the exclusivity and pay the anticipated litigation cost. Thus, the
agreement does not seem to be the abuse of the exclusive right granted to the
patentee.

immediately condemned the settlements because of their absolute anti-competitive nature, and
discounted the merits of the patent litigation.").
150 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 330-34 (listing the factors determining reasonableness
including the validity and coverage of the patent, the relative size of the payment, and the entry
ability of third parties).
151 See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 646-47 ("Some critics have called the standard
'a euphemism for an endless economic inquiry resulting in a defense verdict' because the rule of
reason standard requires so much time and expense."); see also Willand K. Tom, The DOJ/FTC
Report on Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights, in ANTITRUST 35, 36-37
(Summer 2007) (questioning whether the DOJ approach based on the relative likelihood of success
of the parties claims, viewed ex ante, would serve "the very purpose of settling the case ... to avoid
a judicial determination of the merits of the parties' claims.").
152See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 396-404; Letzler & Pfaffenroth, supra note
61, at 83 ("[Tlhe proposed [per se rule] legislation would enact a rule more sweeping than the
position the FTC has taken in any of its cases to date.").
153 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548
U.S. 919 (2005) (No. 05-273), 2005 WL 2105243. But see Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713
F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very
definition of 'property.' That the property right... may be used in a scheme violative of antitrust
laws creates no 'conflict' between laws establishing any of those property rights and the antitrust
laws." (emphasis in original)).
154 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006); see Davis, supranote 136, at 32.
155 See 35 U.S.C. § 282. But see CARRIER, supra note 8, at 346 ("In the 1990s, generics won
nearly 75 percent of their challenges to patents on drugs such as Prozac, Zantac, Taxol, and
Plantinol.").

[9:528 2009]

"Pay-For-Delay" Settlements in Pharmaceutical
Litigation

545

The Sixth Circuit recognized the merit of the per se rule in terms of the
conservation of judicial resources. 15 6 The Supreme Court, however, stated the per se
approach is proper only when one can "predict with confidence that the rule of reason
will condemn it."'157 Additionally, the application of the per se rule should be avoided
when "the economic impact is not immediately obvious."158 The antitrust analysis of
"pay-for-delay" settlements and their economic impact on innovation and the health
care industry involve three interrelated regulatory schemes and require careful
balancing of key factors.
Currently, experience with this relatively new and
15 9
unfamiliar business practice is not sufficient to warrant the per se treatment.

B. EvaluationofProposedLegislation andDOJApproach
H.R. 3962 pending in current Congress condemns "pay-for-delay" settlements as
per se illegal. 160 Thus, as the above per se analysis shows, the legislation is likely to
prohibit pro-competitive "pay-for-delay" settlements involving compensation to the
generic firm. 161 Amended S. 369 and the DOJ approach may properly predict the
pro-competitive nature of the settlements. They are, however, likely to require
lengthy proceedings to conduct overly detailed analyses.

1. Per Se Illegal Treatment in House Bil
H.R. 3962 prohibits all "pay-for-delay" settlements where the generic firm starts
marketing its product before the patent expiration and receives some payment from
the patentee. 162 This is essentially the per se illegal treatment of "pay-for-delay"
settlements and provides antitrust defendants with no opportunity to argue potential

156 See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 909 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he virtue/vice
of the per se rule is that it allows courts to presume that certain behaviors as a class are

anticompetitive without expending judicial resources to evaluate the actual anticompetitive effects

or procompetitive
justifications in a particular case.").
157
Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
158 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
cert. de-nied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009).
159 See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 653 ("[T]he three standards that are used for
evaluating whether challenged conduct violates the antitrust laws continue to be reassessed and
refined, particularly when they are applied to industries, such as health care, for which the courts
do not have sufficient familiarity to understand the economic and other applicable criteria.").
160 See Letzler & Pfaffenroth, supra note 61, at 83 ("The supporters would argue that this is a
routine application of the per se rule to an agreement not to compete.").
161 See Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003) ("If
any settlement agreement is thus to be classified as involving a forbidden 'reverse payment,' we
shall have no more patent settlements.").
162 See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 2573(b) (2009)
(providing it is unlawful to enter into an agreement where "an ANDA filer receives anything of
value," and "the ANDA filer agrees to limit or forego research, development, manufacturing,
marketing, or sales, for any period of time," except when the value received by the ANDA filer
includes no more than the right to market the drug before the expiration of the patent or any other
statutory exclusivity).
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pro-competitive effects of the settlement. 163 This quick condemnation is unwarranted
unless the antitrust tribunal finds some indication that a particular settlement is
164
intended to mask sham litigation over objectively baseless claims.
As an exception to the blanket condemnation of "pay-for-delay" settlements, the
bill provides that the FTC may allow certain settlement agreements when the
commission finds pro-competitive and pro-consumer effects. 165 This FTC exemption,
however, may have a limited effect because the FTC may not be willing to
promulgate specific rules. 166 Instead, the FTC and the DOJ are likely to issue only
guidelines to assist practitioners, as they have done in the past. 167 Thus, the FTC
exemption in the proposed bill may not produce the intended results.

2. Effects of the Per Se Illegal Treatment
H.R. 3962 prohibiting the "pay-for-delay" practice is likely to discourage generic
challenges of at least some patents because the limited availability of a desirable
settlement increases uncertainty and the cost of litigation. 168 Even if a generic firm
believes it could prevail in litigation, it may have to settle with an unfavorable
agreement without any compensation besides the early market entry. The fixed date
of generic entry before the patent expiration benefits the generic firm and the
consumer, but the firm still needs to compete with well-established brand-name
products. Thus, the financial benefit the generic firm can obtain from the early
163 But see id. (providing that certain agreements may be exempt if the FTC finds the
agreements to be "in furtherance of market competition and for the benefit of consumers").
164See, e.g., Profl Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 51
(1993) (describing sham litigation based on an objectively baseless claim).
165See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 2573(b) (2009) ("The
Federal Trade Commission may, by rule promulgated under section 553 of title 5, United States
Code, exempt certain agreements.., if the Commission finds such agreements to be in furtherance
of market competition and for the benefit of consumers.").
166 See Letzler & Pfaffenroth, supra note 61, at 85.
It is one thing to pass a statute that generally gets it right and let the
agency use its rule-making authority to fill gaps in the law, but to ask the FTC to
take a statute that as written gets it wrong and try to fix it by carving out
exceptions that are at odds with premise of the bill looks fundamentally
inconsistent with the appropriate division of responsibility between the legislative
branch and the executive branch.
Id.
167See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 631 (listing some of the guidelines important
to regulators and practitioners involved with the pharmaceutical industry-The Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995), The Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy in Health Care Guidelines (1996), The Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1997), The
Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2006), and The Guidelines for Collaborations by
Competitors (2000)).
168See Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2009: Hearing on HR. 1706
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (testimony of Theodore C. Whitehouse, Willkie Far &
Gallagher LLP on behalf of Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.), available at http://energycommerce.
house.gov/Press_111/20090331/testimony-whitehouse.pdf ("Based on its considerable experience
with Hatch-Waxman litigation, Teva strongly believes that settlements of those cases are absolutely
necessary part of the Hatch-Waxman process.").
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market entry remains uncertain, as compared to the actual payment from the
patentee. The lack of reasonable compensation could seriously harm smaller generic
firms needing resources for developing their own products and surviving the current
weak economy. 169 The reduction of incentives for generics may lead to fewer generic
players in the market, which could harm consumers. 170 Causing such a negative
impact on consumers is contrary to the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 171 Thus,
the proposed bill needs modifications to permit settlements with a certain level of
172
potential pro-competitive effects.
One could argue that the bill does not prohibit all settlements because it allows
exceptions when the FTC agrees. 173 However, whether a settlement falls within the
exception is subject to the FTC discretion, and business entities cannot readily
predict what kind of agreements will qualify for the exception. To encourage a swift
resolution of litigation with a lawful settlement, the exception should be a safe
174
harbor provision with more specific requirements to allow a quick evaluation.

3. Complex Analysis UnderSenate Bill andDOJApproach
The tests that the Senate bill and the DOJ approach provide lead to lengthy and
complex analyses not suitable for examining the "pay-for-delay" settlements. The
amended S. 369 presumes "pay-for-delay" settlements unlawful, but the settlement
parties can overcome the presumption by showing pro-competitive effects of the
agreement. 175 The antitrust tribunal then employs a seven-factor test to examine

169

See Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-sphttingSettlements and the Reverse PaymentFallacy,71

ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1063 (2004) ("A cash-strapped alleged infringer.., needs to receive cash

earlier rather than later.").
170 See Letzler & Pfaffenroth, supra note 61, at 84 ("Making settlements harder will reduce the
incentive to challenge a patent.").
171 See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 93, at 1433
("The Hatch-Waxman Act was an attempt to streamline the procedure for obtaining FDA approval of
generic pharmaceuticals... and to provide incentives for cheaper generics to come to market.").
172 See Pay to Delay: Are Patent Settlements That Delay Generic Drug Market Entry
Anticompetitive?: Hearingon HR. 1706 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy,
111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Bret M. Dickey, Senior Vice President, Compass Lexecon),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Dickey090603.pdf.
"[Elconomic models
demonstrate that when the real-world complexities of litigation are accounted for [reverse payment]
settlements can in fact benefit consumers." Id. "[T]he competitive effects of a particular settlement
will depend importantly upon the underlying strength of the patent." Id. at 3.
173 See Anticompetitive Pay-for-Delay Settlements in the PharmaceuticalIndustry:
Why
Consumers and the FederalGovernmentAre Paying Too much for PrescriptionDrugs: Hearingon

HR. 1706 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Poicy, 111th Cong. 19 (2009)
(statement of Federal Trade Commission), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
Feinstein090603.pdf (stating the proposed bill "provides flexibility by authorizing the FTC to adopt
rules to exempt other agreements from the general prohibition"). But see Letzler & Pfaffenroth,
supra note 61, at 85 (criticizing the idea that a statute generally "gets it wrong" and the FTC must
"fix it by carving out exceptions").
174See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006); see also Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536
F.3d 1256, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (addressing a safe harbor provision of patent infringement for
activities in relation to the FDA regulatory process).
175See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. § 28(a)(2)(A), (b) (2009).
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whether the evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption.17 6 This analysis
under multiple factors would be administratively inconvenient, less predictable, and
as complex as the rule of reason analysis under the DOJ approach.
Besides the length of the list, the amended S. 369 defines some factors only
vaguely. One example is the factor considering the revenue loss by the patent holder
upon losing the patent litigation.17 7 The loss in the patent litigation could be
obtaining a judgment of patent invalidity or non-infringement. The revenue loss
from an invalidity judgment may be greater than that from a non-infringement
judgment because patent invalidation could allow other generics to enter the market
as well.178 Amended S. 369, however, simply defines the revenue loss as the
reduction when the patentee has lost the patent litigation and does not adequately
identify other factors, such as reduction in future revenue after other generics have
entered the market. 7 9 Furthermore, the estimate of the revenue loss would depend
on various conditions such as the number and timing of generic entries and is thus
likely to be speculative. The multi-factor test in the amended S. 369 only raises
18 0
questions and leads to continued litigation when parties are willing to settle.
Similarly, the DOJ approach employing the rule of reason standard requires
overly broad and expensive analysis unfavorable for efficient enforcement.1 81 Also,
this approach is not very effective in preventing settlements with lower payments but
perceived anti-competitive effects. The DOJ states that the parties can "clearly rebut
the presumption if they show the payment was no more than an amount
commensurate with the patent holder's avoided litigation costs." 18 2 The size of the
payment is such a dispositive factor that companies can easily make a seemingly
lawful deal even if it unreasonably restrains competition. Pharmaceutical litigations
arising out of the Hatch-Waxman framework largely differ from one another, and the
antitrust analysis should be more fact-specific in order to properly block anti18 3
competitive settlements.
Thus, the test proposed in S. 369 and the DOJ rule of reason approach are not
suitable for the antitrust analysis of "pay-for-delay" settlements. A more effective
approach is to identify only the key elements and quickly balance the effects of "payfor-delay" settlements. Additionally, there should be a safe harbor provision with
Id. § 28(b).
177Id. § 28(b)(5).
176

178

See Pay to Delay: Are Patent Settlements That Delay Generic Drug Market Entry

Anticompetitive?: Hearingon HR. 1706 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy,
111th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Bret M. Dickey, Senior Vice President, Compass Lexecon),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Dickey09o6O3.pdf ("The use of overly simple
economic models can inappropriately lead to the conclusion that 'reverse payment' settlements will
always reduce competition.").
179See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. § 28(b)(5) (2009).
180 See DOJ Brief, supra note 109, at 25-26 (noting concerns over unduly complicated
litigation).
181 See Arthur, supra note 91, at 341 ("A standard that is overly cumbersome and expensive
will hinder effective enforcement.").
182DOJBrief supra note 109, at 25-26.
183See CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at 692 (grouping Hatch-Waxman Act settlements
into three categories, and stating the traditional rule of reason does not work for one group of
settlements where the agreement itself looks like an antitrust violation but the presence of
intellectual property rights may absolve all of the antitrust issues).
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specific requirements so that practitioners can evaluate whether a proposed
84
settlement falls within the provision.

III. PROPOSAL
This comment proposes to modify the pending legislation to allow "pay-for-delay"
settlements if their pro-competitive effects are sufficient under the quick look
standard. Congress should also consider including a safe harbor provision that
85
codifies specific conditions required for a settlement agreement to be lawful.

A. Requirement to Show Sufficient Pro-CompetitiveEffects
86
Settlements that promote competition are legal under the antitrust laws.
Thus, the pending House bill should be modified to permit "pay-for-delay"
settlements if the parties can show sufficient pro-competitive effects. The parties
may show that their agreement allows multiple generics to enter months before
patent expiration and does not involve a disproportionally large payment. 8 7 Instead
of full investigations under the seven-factor test in the Senate bill or the DOJ rule of
reason, this approach contemplates applying the quick look standard in a sliding
scale.
Under the proposed approach, an antitrust tribunal may first consider several
key factors such as the size of the payment, the patented subject matter, and the
entry ability of generics. 8 8 It then determines the level of quickness suitable for the
particular circumstance. If the settlement has obvious anti-competitive effects such
as the unavailability of early generic entries, the burden shifts to the defendants to
provide justifications of the settlement. The tribunal will then balance the likely
anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects.
On the other hand, if the anticompetitive effects are not immediately obvious, the tribunal may require some
showing of actual anti-competitive effects, instead of presuming illegality. Some
litigations within the Hatch-Waxman context are quite complex, involving multiple
parties and exclusivity provisions. In such situations, the tribunal can conduct an

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006) (providing a safe harbor for patent infringement).
See Arthur, supra note 91, at 359-62 (describing an analysis under a variation of the quick
look standard, which takes a "sliding scale approach that tailors the inquiry to the particular
circumstances"); see also Tom, supra note 151, at 37 (stating the DOJ has proposed an analysis
involving a "limited examination into the relative merits of the patent claims").
186 See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
("Settlement of patent claims by agreement between the parties- -including exchange of
consideration--rather than by litigation is not precluded by the Sherman Act even though it may
have some adverse effects on competition."), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009).
187 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 334 ("[Tlhe combination of a 'large' payment from the
patentee to the challenger, plus physical or legal conditions that make it unlikely that third parties
can immediately enter the market, creates a strong presumption of unreasonableness.").
188 See id. at 330; HUTT ET AL., supra note 28, at 764 ("[Tlhe first generic competitor results in
184
185

only about a 5 percent reduction in price, whereas the second brings the price down to about 50
percent of the pioneer drug price.... With a large number of competitors it can reach 10 percent or

lower.").
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analysis that is somewhat detailed but still quicker, as compared to the rule of reason
analysis.
The proposed approach can provide more flexible and fact-specific analyses than
the per se rule and does not require lengthy court proceedings as does the rule of
reason standard. In conducting a quick look analysis, the antitrust tribunal may
decide on pleadings and arguments or order a "mediated mini-trial" that has "proved
useful in disputes involving mixed questions of law and fact in patent infringement
189
cases."

B. Effect of the Modified Legislation
The modified legislation will effectively block only the anti-competitive
settlements where parties cannot prove sufficient pro-competitive effects and
"soundness of settled patent claims" under the circumstances. 190
It permits
objectively reasonable settlements and does not disturb the policy favoring
settlements over unnecessary litigation. 191 On the other hand, the per se illegal
treatment in the pending House bill fails to acknowledge the patent zone protected
by patent law and its exclusionary effect. 192 Such a drastic measure may be
necessary to reduce the health care costs, even if some pro-competitive agreements
could be prohibited as well. 193 Before taking a drastic measure that has a conceivable
detrimental effect, however, Congress should consider a more conservative approach
along with a measure to make the "pay-for-delay" strategy less beneficial. The
measure can include a modification of the Hatch-Waxman Act itself to provide drug
makers certain incentives for continuing litigation rather than settling it.94
189SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, AM. BAR Assoc., THE ANTITRUST COUNTERATTACK IN PATENT
INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION 181 (1995) [hereinafter SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE ANTITRUST
COUNTERATTACK]. But see CARRIER, supra note 8, at 375.
The appropriate treatment of patent settlements thus depends on the
validity of the patent and existence of infringement. But the most straightforward
way to determine these issues, patent litigation, is not appropriate in this setting.
Determining patent validity and infringement would require significant analysis
and testimony on complex issues such as patent claim interpretation and
infringement analysis. Such inquiries, which could take weeks, cannot be inserted
as mini-trials within antitrust cases.
CARRIER, supra note 8, at 375.
190 See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 1735.
191See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
("[T]here is a long-standing policy in the law in favor of settlements, and this policy extends to
patent infringement litigation."), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009).
192See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 1733-34 (describing an analytical framework that allows
defendants in antitrust proceedings to present "general defenses that arise in exclusive dealing
claims" and "additional considerations that might arise from the presence of the IP right").
193See CARRIER, supra note 8, at 345 ("Consumers spend billions of dollars on prescription
drugs. Senior citizens choose between medicine and food.... [A] tidal wave of high drug prices is
crashing across the U.S. economy. One of the primary culprits has been the increase in ["pay-fordelay" settlements].").
194See Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2009: Hearing on HR. 1706
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy, 111th Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of
Bernard C. Sherman, CEO, Apotex Inc.), http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press-111/20090331/
testimony-sherman.pdf (proposing an amendment to allow a subsequent ANDA filer who wins
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One possible objection to the proposed quick look analysis is that considering the
patented subject matter requires some familiarity with the patent laws and technical
matters. The FTC is well-equipped for analyzing violations of antitrust laws rather
than patent laws, and can only conduct limited inquiries into the patent matters. To
address technical issues properly, an antitrust tribunal may have a committee
consisting of scientific experts from each side and a few neutral experts, as in
95
arbitration proceedings.1
Another possible objection is that the quick look may create inconsistency in
terms of the amount or depth of the quick look. 196 Flexible methods taking a sliding
scale approach could be subject to a varying degree of discretion. 197 Antitrust issues
are, however, fact-specific and unique in each situation, and thus courts have
employed the rule of reason as a default standard. 198 The truncated rule of reason is
well suited because lengthy proceedings might prevent swift entries of generic
products. To facilitate a uniform analysis, Congress should consider a safe harbor
provision that codifies specific conditions for an agreement to be lawful, similar to the
issue of fair use in copyright law. 199 The safe harbor provision will help drug makers
evaluate whether a proposed settlement agreement will survive antitrust scrutiny.
The modified legislation applying the quick look standard to "pay-for-delay"
settlements combined with the measures for uniform antitrust analyses will
effectively block anti-competitive settlements and protect consumer access to generic
drugs by allowing pro-competitive settlements.

litigation to share the generic exclusivity with the first ANDA filer so that the subsequent ANDA
filer has incentives to continue litigation); see also Drug Price Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315,
111th Cong. §2(a) (2009) (proposing to expand the application of generic exclusivity to a subsequent
ANDA filer that receives a favorable court decision).
195 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 937 (2001);
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE ANTITRUST COUNTERATTACK, supra note 189, at 185.
In 1982, the Patent Act was amended to add Section 294, which stated that
parties were authorized to arbitrate questions of patent validity and
infringement.... In another important international patent-antitrust dispute, the
parties achieved similar success when they chose an effective arbitration
panel.... The arbitration was described as a 'full blown federal trial on an
expedited basis.' What would have taken years and millions of dollars under
traditional litigation was resolved in nine months.
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE ANTITRUST COUNTERATTACK, supra.
196See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999); see also AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 81, at 393 ("[J]udgments can sometimes be made on the basis of the
parties' agreements in light of what the judges know about the economy and in light of such modest
information as may be available at the beginning of the lawsuit.").
197But see Arthur, supra note 91, at 362 (suggesting many lower courts have ample judicial
experience in applying the quick look standard to general antitrust claims).
198See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) ("Since the early years of
this century a judicial gloss on this statutory language [of the Sherman Act] has established the
'rule of reason' as the prevailing standard of analysis."); CLARK & POINDEXTER, supra note 14, at
646.
199See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (providing that the determination whether the use of a
copyrighted work constitutes a fair use requires the consideration of "(1) the purpose and character
of the use ... (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used ... and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market").

[9:528 2009]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

CONCLUSION

Intense debates on the legislation addressing "pay-for-delay" settlements
indicate the strong need for a law that facilitates consumer access to generics and yet
protects "legitimate rewards of patent monopoly" attainable only after extensive
research and investment.20 0
The House bill pending in current Congress
categorically prohibits "pay-for-delay" settlements, which could harm the
pharmaceutical industry by eliminating a way out of frequent litigation and thus
discouraging patent challenges. 20 1
Some settlements provide earlier generic
entries, 2 02 and others allow possibly invalid patents to remain in effect. 20 3 A more
flexible approach allowing "pay-for-delay" settlements based on the level of plausible
pro-competitive effects is more suitable for preventing the erosion of the antitrust
zone into the patent zone, and vice versa.

200 United States v. StudiengeselIschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
see 155 CONG. REC. H12889 (2009) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith) ("[T]he proposed solution to
this problem, incorporated in Sec. 2573, goes too far. The [H.R. 3962] bill calls for a ban on all
Hatch-Waxman settlements that feature any consideration, such as cash or an exchange of patents,
in addition to the date of entry."); see also Pay to Delay: Are Patent Settlements That Delay Generic
Drug Market Entry Anticompetitive?." Hearingon HR. 1706 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and

Competition PoKey, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of William Vaughan, Senior Health Policy

Analyst
Consumers
Union),
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Vaughan090603.pdf
("Consumers Union absolutely believes that payments between brand and generic drug companies
that delay the entry of generic drugs are bad for consumers and are the very definition of anticompetitive behavior.").
201 See Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003) ("A
ban on reverse-payment settlements would reduce the incentive to challenge patents by reducing
the challenger's settlement options should he be sued for infringement, and so might well be thought
anticompetitive."); ProtectingConsumerAccess to GenericDrugsAct of2009: Hearingon HR. 1706
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Pohey, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of
Theodore C. Whitehouse, Willkie Far & Gallagher LLP on behalf of Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
Inc.), availableat http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press-111/20090331/testimony-whitehouse.pdf.
202 See Pay to Delay: Are Patent Settlements That Delay Generic Drug Market Entry
Anticompetitive?: Hearingon HR. 1706 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Poicy,
111th Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of Heather Bresch, Chief Operating Officer, Mylan Inc.), available
at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Bresch090603.pdf ("[T]he breast cancer treatment
Tamoxifen® allowed a generic version to enter the market nine years before the date the relevant
patent expired.").
203 McLean, supra note 2, at 122, 126 (describing a situation where a "pay-for-delay" settlement
would have allowed an invalid patent to remain in effect and keep generics off the market).

